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10 INTRODUCTION 
Different- factors have been cited as causes of the 
present international debt crisis In one extreme critics 
point to the imprudent lending practices of commercial 
banks wherein they cite the capital-asset ratios as having 
fallen to 5 percent or less during the 1980s (Kettel and 
Magnus 1986) On the other hand debtor nations have been 
accused of severe economic mismanagement and, to some 
extent corrupt practices among government officials The 
real reasons for the debt crisis would, of course fall 
somewhere in between, with exogenous shocks such as the 
deterioration in the terms of trade of developing countries 
also figuring m the argument 
One significant factor attributed to the myopic 
policies of economic ministers of developing countries is 
the pegging of exchange rates despite the rise of the 
domestic inflation rate relative to the world inflation 
rate This leads to what is termed as an overvalued 
currency resulting primarily m a lower export revenue and a 
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greater propensity to import. An overvalued currency has 
been isolated as the chief cause of the external debt 
problem of Chile (Dornbusch, 1985} and as an important 
consideration in the case of the Philippines (De Dios, 
1984). 
In the current debt rescheduling negotiations involving 
either the Paris Club or commercial banks, it is usually 
required that the debtor nation, if it is an IMF member, to 
have in force a stabilisation program with the IMF before 
rescheduling provisions become effective. Part of the IMF 
program usually includes an item for the devaluation of the 
exchange rate for it to reflect a more realistic figure. 
The traditional basis for this approach to devaluation 
an a tool for stabilisation and growth is the textbook 
theory that a fall in the exchange rate, if it has any real 
effects at all, would be expansionary, i.e., the resulting 
increase in competitiveness of a country's exports and the 
simultaneous rise in the cost of imports would switch 
foreign and domestic demand toward domestic goods. If thefre 
are unemployed resources, then a devaluation is expected to 
lead to a rise in output; otherwise, only domestic prices 
would rise. 
The more recent literature deals with the absorption 
and monetary approaches to an exchange rate devaluation wijfch 
IMF models putting more emphasis on the latter. The 
general idea associated with both these approaches is that 
an exchange rate devaluation will reduce domestic absorption 
which simultaneously frees resources for expansion in the 
export sector and reduces demand for imports. The net 
result is an improvement in the current account and at least 
the same level of output (as the fall in aggregate demand in 
the domestic sector is translated into a rise in export 
revenue and a fall in import expenditure). 
Reservations, however, have been raised as to the 
efficacy of an exchange rate devaluation to close the gap in 
the current account (examples of which are presented in Bird 
[1983]). Moreover, there is a possibility that a fall in 
output will accompany the reduction in expenditure. Krugman 
and Taylor (1978) summarise and extend the branch of 
research that deals with the various channels through which 
a decline in real output is brought about by contractionary 
influences on aggregate demand. In their view, the three 
most important circumstances wherein a devaluation 
ultimately brings about a fall in output are the 
following:^/ 
a) When devaluation takes place with an existing trade 
deficit, price increases of traded goods immediately reduce 
real income at home and increase it abroad, since foreign 
currency payments exceed receipts. Within the home country, 
the value of "foreign savings" goes up ex ante, aggregate 
demand goes down ex post, and imports fall along with it. 
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The larger the initial deficit, the greater th< 
contractionary outcome. 
b) Even if foreign trade is initially in balance 
devaluation raises prices of traded goods relative to horn* 
goods, giving rise to windfall profits in export and import-
competing industries. If money wages lag the price increase 
and if marginal propensity to save from profits is higher 
than from wages, ex ante national savings goes up. The 
magnitude of the resulting contraction depends on the 
difference between savings propensities of the two classes. 
c) Finally, if there are ad valorem taxes on exports 
or imports, devaluation redistributes income from the 
private sector to the government, which has a saving 
propensity of unity in the short run. Once again, the final 
outcome is reduction in aggregate demand. 
ECrugman and Taylor develop these arguments witnm tne 
framework of a simple Keynes-Kalecki model of an open-
economy. In a recent paper, Barbone and Rivera-Batiz (1987) 
utilise a similar framework and show that even if the above 
effects do not operate, devaluation can still be 
contractionary when the economy is host to a substantial 
amount of foreign investment. 
Approaching the problem from the opposite end of the 
spectrum, van Wijnbergen <1986) brings into focus the ways 
by which a devaluation csm exert a contractionary effect on 
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aggregate supply The first channel arises when as is 
typical m many developing countries imported goods play a 
significant role in the production process A devaluation 
raises the relative price of imported inputs versus domestic 
final goods The ensuing rise in variable costs induces a 
fall m the output that firms are willing to produce This 
contractionary effect may be partly offset by possibilities 
of substitution between imported inputs and domestic factors 
of production and by the expansionary effects of expenditure 
switching A second contractionary channel is created when 
real wages are indexed to some figures like the con.umer 
price index which accounts for both domestic and foreign 
good's An increase m competitiveness implies that foreign 
goods become more expensive than domestic goods If real 
wages are indexed to a consumption asset that includes 
foreign goods this implies that real product wages rise and 
that the improvement in competitiveness occurs at the 
expense of domestic production The third contractionary 
channel is a result of the effect of the increase m the 
price level on the real volume of bank credit In many 
developing countries firms finance fixed and working 
capital requirements through bank loans The rise m the 
price level associated with a devaluation leads to a rise in 
nominal demand for bank credit, which given a fixed nominal 
money supply leads in turn to a rise in real interest rates 
and thus a rise m the interest component of costs 
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This paper draws mainly on -the aggregate demand 
approach "to address the issue of the effects of an exchange 
rate devaluation on the economy of a developing country with 
an external debt overhang Bird has mentioned this as an 
increasingly important source of demand deflation while van 
Wijribergen has incorporated this possibility in his 
analysis The latter however considers only the case of 
privately owed debt in the case of Bird he does not refer 
to a formal model that elaborates on the conditions that 
lead to <1 contraction m output following an exchange rate 
devaluation We will consider only the case where the 
external debt ij owed by the government or is government 
guaranteed hence the possible contractionary channel will 
be similar to the fiscal effects described as the third case 
by Krugman and Taylor 
In a developing country given the present level of 
external debt and the fact that much of it is owed by the 
government or is government-guaranteed an exchange rate 
devaluation may also lead to strong inflationary pressure 
Dornbu^ch (1986) describes this condition as one where 
debt service is immensely inflationary in a country 
that cannot afford it Blaming inflation on budget 
deficits is not wrong but misses the point that when 
the resources for debt service without recourse to 
money creation are not available then they must come 
out of the inflation tax Needless to say the 
inflation tax i** highly regressive so that m the end 
debt service is either financed by cuts m social 
spending increased social security taxes or increased 
seignorage 
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In section 2 0, we will present a model that will deal 
formally with the problem oust described Comparative 
static results are derived m the third section It will be 
shown that a devaluation in the presence of an external debt 
will generally lead to a fall m real output and a rise m 
prices The short run political implications of such a 
stagflationary situation are discussed in the last section 
2 0 THE MQDEL 
The following structural model will be used to analyse 
whether or not a fall m the exchange rate will prove 
detrimental to the economy m the sense of a lower growth 
rate of real output and a higher price level given an 
existing level of external debt 
Y = C(Y-tY M/P) + I(r-Trc Q) + G/P + X(ePx/P) -
Q(Y,ePm/P) (1) 
M/P = L(Y r) (2) 
AM = G + GD - tPY (3) 
P = Z(M/Y ePm w) ( 4 ) 
Y - output (income) at constant prices 
C - coiiSumfctiori expenditure at constant prices 
I - investment expenditure at constant prices 
<3 -4 government spending for productive endeavors at 
current prices 
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X - export, revenue at constant prices 
Q - import expenditure at constant prices 
M - money supply 
Gr> - interest expenditure on current external debt 
equivalent to e{iD) where 1 is the interest rate on 
the debt D which is measured m units of foreign 
currency (usually m dollars) 
P - overall price index (can be taken as GNP deflator) 
Pm - import price index 
Px - export price index 
TTr - inflationary expectations for purposes of 
simplification we assume that tt is equal to fr 
the actual rate of inflation 
e - nominal exchange rate 
r - interest rate 
t - tax rate 
w - wage rate 
The model represents a small open economy which 
produces and trades one good but the imported good and the 
exported good are not highly substitutable The consumption 
function incorporates the real balance effect but does not 
differentiate among the various typ^s of consumer groups 
Investment expenditures depend on the real interest rate and 
9 
on the availability of imports (particularly capital goods) 
We assume complete sterilisation of faovement-s in the level 
of foreign exchange reserves hence, the change in money 
supply results solely from the financing of the budget 
deficit The latter is done purely by ^eignorage 
The price equation specified to reflect mark-up 
behavior on the part of the firms The relevant costs of 
production are due to co„t of imports and wages The mark-
up rate is influenced by excess aggregate demand modelled 
here as M/Y Both the investment equation and price 
equation are developed along the lines of structuralist 
macroeconomics (see Taylor [1983]) which is slowly being 
accepted as the appropriate tool for policy analysis m 
developing countries The exchange rate and the tax rate 
are policy variable, and we assume the absence of an 
indexation policy and hence the wage rate is taken to be 
exogenous 
Using tjhe mpdel as our framework we could situate some 
of the more important issues at hand Ap exchange rate D 
devaluation Vfould result ^ in an increase in G Assuming 
that both tax revenues? (tPY) and G remap coostant then the 
budget deficit would increase leading to an unequivocal 
rise m the price level The resulting inflation"rate and 
budget ^f^cit may be inconsistent with qfcher pyowa^ipna * in 
the IMF s-fcabi,!*:?^!^ pf,pgram 
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On the other hand, if the government attempts to 
maintain a certain budget deficit, it may decide to lower G 
or increase t, both of which have recessionary effects on 
the economy in terms of a lower level of Y. It must be 
noted that P may still increase ias a result of the increase 
in e and this, coupled with a lower Y, leads to a 
stagflationary situation. 
Finally, if the government is constrained by political 
reasons to maintain G and the present tax structure, the 
only means by which it may keep the budget deficit within a 
certain level is to postponfe interest payments on external 
debt obligations. 
For the purpose of comparative statics, we assume th£t 
the budget deficit is fixed at a certain fraction g of real 
output at current prices.®/ This may be taken to be a 
policy directive of the IMF. Hence, the budget deficit is 
equal to gPY. Furthermore, only G, government expenditures 
for productive endeavors, is adjusted to maintain the 
appropriate ceiling on the budget deficit. We also abstract 
from exogenous foreign capital flows in this ftiodel. This 
process is captured by the following equation: 
G•= gPY + tPY - e(iD) (5) 
In epilation (5), while it - is cl^ar that tax revenues kre 
fully indexed to price increases©, implicit condition is 
that the marginal propensity to save of the government out 
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of additional revenues due to price changes is equal to 
aero. By incorporating this condition into our model, we 
obtain the modified version of equations (1) and (3): 
v Y * C( Y-tY, M/P) +-I(r~ir,Q) + gY + tY ~ e(iD)/P + X(ePx/P) - Q(Y,ePm/P) (1>) 
AM - gPY (3'} 
3 . 0 COMPARATIVE STATICS 
Differentiation of the system of- Equations consisting 
of <1'>, (2), (3') and (4) results in the following (shown 
in Figure 1):?/ 
i - Cjd-t) - Qjdj-n - g -1 
-gp 
-Cj -CjM + Ij -
1/p 
1 
-Z, 
P2 >-1 P' 
+ X'e Pa + Q2(I2-1) e fa 
-v 
-tfr 
l 
it X' Px q, (1-1.) Pm P * ? 
Figure 1 
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We assume the usual signs of partial derivations, thus: C*, 
I a, X', Qa, Li, Zi, Zs > 0, and Ii , Qz, L= < 0. 
From equation (3J) we derive the condition that M > gPY 
and using this inequality, we can show that a sufficient 
condition for the Jacobian determinant to be positive is: 
iD > [X'Px + 0=^(1* - 1}] (6) 
For reasons to be specified later, the above inequality 
should hold. 
By applying Cramer's rule we can obtain expressions 
SY/Se and S~P/£e, The inequality in (6) is one of two 
sufficient conditions for £Y/Se to be less than zero with 
the other being: 
1 - Zig - Z®ePm/P > 0 (7) 
The expression in (7) is a weighted average of the 
factors influencing the price level. It can also be 
interpreted as a stability condition for the model. 
Assuming that both Z* and are less than unity, and since 
g is a relatively small number (in the order of .04), the 
inequality should hold. 
An expenditure switching effect and the contractionary 
influence of an external debt overhang are the prominent 
elements in the inequality expressed in (6). Increases in Y 
come by way of a rise in export earnings and a decrease in 
expenditures for imports. On the other hand, a fall in 
13 
income could arise due to "the decrease in imports that 
result in a decline in investment outlays, and the increase 
in the debt service burden. The following stylized facts 
regarding many developing countries lead to the conclusion 
that the inequality depicted in (6) is'satisfied:?' 
a) The low elasticity of export revenue with respect to 
the exchange rate; 
b) The large amount of external debt outstanding; and 
c) The heavy dependence of the economy on imports for 
investment and production purposes, both for the domestic 
and export sectors. 
We thus have a situation where a devaluation of the 
exchange rate results in an unambiguous decline in income. 
It is quite surprising that the real balance effect has no 
significant role in determining the sign of &Y/S& although 
it does affect the magnitude of the derivative. Another 
interesting point is that despite taxes being fully indexed 
to prices and a government marginal propensity to save equal 
to aero the above result is obtained. Such is the strength 
of the effect of an external debt overhang. 
In the case of tfP/tfe, (6) is also a sufficient 
condition for the derivative to be greater than aero. In 
addition the inequality Li > g must be satisfied which 
should be true given the magnitude of g and the fact that 
money supply generally keeps pace with income. 
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4 . 0 POLITICS, DEBT AND DEVALUATION 
The model as developed is useful only for analysis of 
the short term effects of a devaluation of the exchange rate 
as the dynamics have not been worked out. IMF programs may 
have long term beneficial effects in terms of greater 
effi ciency in investment projects, the streamlining of 
import restrictions that are consistent with an exchange 
rate devaluation, and general improvements in productivity. 
However, it must be pointed out that for several developing 
countries, political conditions dictate that the short term 
be of utmost priority. Prescriptions for a devaluation that 
lead to a fall in real output and a rise in the price level 
may have disastrous effects on the stability of democratic 
governments such, as in Argentina and the Philippines."'/ 
In order to avoid a stagflationary situation without 
( 
exceeding the limit on the budget deficit, the only recourse 
is to increase G while at the same time reduce debt service 
payments. T;' In other words, what is called for is a debt 
relief program which, unfortunately, commercial banks are 
hesitant or even unwilling to undertake. 
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ENDNOTES 
xIn the monetary approach, an exchange rate devaluation 
is an expenditure switching device working mainly through 
the real balance effect. The increase in the price of 
foreign exchange reduces real balances. Assuming that the 
demand for money is exogenously determined, the excess 
demand for money is translated into a reduction in 
absorption and a balance-of-payments surplus which is the 
vehicle by which money balances are replenished. 
"'Krugman and Taylor, p. 446. 
3This is the summary of van Wijnbergen's main results 
as presented by Edwards and Ahamed (1986), 
^Krugman and Taylor specify the equation as 
P = (atw + awPrnXl + s) 
where a»... and ati are input coefficients of labor and imports, 
respectively, into home goods and s is the markup rate. In 
our analysis s = s(M/Y), and we generalise the price 
equation as in (4) for the sake of clarity and simplicity. 
In justifying this method Taylor (1983) states: 
The markup specification broadly fits the 
data and is far simpler to manipulate than 
neoclassical cost functions. (p, 9) 
wIn the model presented by Dornbusch (1986), g is an 
increasing function of the inflation rate and the real 
exchange rate. This specification may be relevant in a 
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situation characterised by chronic hyperinflation as is the 
case in Argentina. However, in developing countries like 
the Philippines the financing of budget deficits by money 
creation has had limited effect on the price level and this 
may be explained by a relative constant value of g. 
mVie employ the following convention in presenting 
partial derivatives. For example, Ci is the partial 
derivative of C with respect to the first argument in the 
function which in this case is (l-t)Y. 
'To be more accurate the condition stated in (6) should 
appear as follows, 
(iD)e„ > tX'Px + QaPmdst - 1)] (6* ) 
where e<„ is the exchange rate for a chosen base period. The 
exchange rate e should be in index form so as to be 
consistent with the price variables in the model. If we 
apply (6') instead of (6) then it may be the case that only 
a modest level of external debt would make (iDJe® swamp the 
value on the right hand side of the inequality. 
®Monsod (1987) has a similar theme but she deals 
directly with the burden of the existing debt overhang and 
its potential destabilising effects on the present 
Philippine government. 
•"We assume of course that an exchange rate devaluation 
is a necessary economic policy. This view can be supported 
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on the grounds that such a move eliminates distortions in 
the trade sector and leads to greater efficiency. Also we 
do not consider the possibility of changing the tax 
structure (i.e. increasing t) even if the model yields the 
result that JY/tft > 0 and £P/£t < 0. The model already 
makes the assumptions of full indexation of tax revenues 
with respect to changes in price and a marginal propensity 
to save of the part of the government of sero. These 
assumptions imply some sort of automatic adjustment in the 
tax structure to compensate for declining real government 
expenditure. 
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